Since 1990 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has adopted the Capabilities Approach as a theoretical framework to evaluate human development. Similar initiatives that intend to make comparisons between countries on quality of life issues have also broad their informational base. In this paper I will clarify the concept of well-being, within the Capabilities Approach, and provide an account of its basic dimensions based on Nussbaum's list of capabilities.
The Capabilities Approach as a framework to measure development The Capabilities Approach developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (Sen 1977 (Sen , 1984 (Sen , 1999 (Sen , 2009 and the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1987 (Nussbaum , 2000 (Nussbaum , 2006 (Nussbaum , 2011 The answer given by Sen is that development has to be Human development; therefore it has to have a real impact on improving people lives. Economic growth is just a mean to the goal of development: the actual goal of development is increasing people's wellbeing and quality of life. In terms of Sen: the goal of Human Development is that people can be able to pursue and achieve the life they have reasons to value, i.e. the life they have reasons to choose. Hence the goal of development should be providing the favourable institutional conditions so that people can achieve this objective: that people can have the real opportunity to effectively achieve the lives they value.
In this theoretical framework emerged the concept of "capability". Sen introduces his concept of capability for the first time in his article "Equality of What?" (Sen 1979) Capability in Sen's theory is the set of vectors which entails the combination of functionings that a human being choose, the functionings are the set of valuable beings and doings a human being can choose from. Therefore, in Sen's view, the goal of development is the expansion of freedom, which the author has largely discussed in his book "Development as freedom" (Sen 1999) , the aim of development should be to guarantee the real opportunities for people realize the life they have reasons to value. In this view Freedom is also the end and the means of development: in order to achieve the goal of freedom, instrumental freedoms should be promoted and guaranteed. Well-being, subjective well-being and welfare These initiatives need to define the empirical and material content of notions such as wellbeing and quality of life. Nevertheless, well-being is a complex and broad concept (Parfit, 1984 , Griffin 1986 , Crisp 2001 , which differs from the notions of welfare and subjective well-being (SWB). Some authors hold that well-being can not be reduced to a mere feeling of happiness, pleasure or subjective satisfaction (Seagal 1991, Dasgupta 1993, 34-44) but well-being also includes the things which are constitutive of our flourishing (O'Neill 1993, 24, Nussbaum 2001 , 2006 , 2011 , Alkire 2002 ). Furthermore, as Sen points out, one may be committed to goals which concern other people's well-being as a part of one's wellbeing (Sen 1999 (Sen , 2009 ). In this sense, well-being is a normative concept because reflects a set of valuable dimensions (Des Gasper 2004, 12, Doyal and Gough 1991).
In particular, the concept of well-being in the capabilities approach, as Sen puts it, is understood as "the life one has reasons to value". This "good life" entails a set of "doings and beings" which are considered valuable by the citizens and therefore should be protected and promoted. The normative stand in Sen's point of view stems from the idea "reasons to value". Therefore not all the "beings and doings" a person is capable of are considered part of this concept of well-being and in this sense the approach differs from the notion of happiness or subjective well-being that is perceived as some sort of self-fulfilling or Well-being as flourishing in the capabilities approach 41 desires fulfilling view. Also is different from the concept of welfare, because this idea is focused on commodities and the possibilities to provide them, the concept of well-being in Sen's approach grounds in what makes a human life worthy, what are those beings and doings that can be reasonable valued. In short, what are the capabilities that when turn into functionings lead to a good life.
However, at this point Sen's theory remains incomplete, because it may seem not only reasonable but also necessary that this approach must be supplement by an account of human functioning in order to determine what these "valuable beings and doings are". Although we do not encounter such a theory of human functioning in Sen's theory, other authors as Martha Nussbaum have carried out this task.
Nussbaum's concept of flourishing
The concept of flourishing plays a pivotal role in Nussbaum's theory because it articulates both the factual and the normative constituent of life. Nussbaum captures this idea, whose theoretical basis grounds in the Aristotelian teleology to generate her theory. Flourishing is the activity by which everything in a process may potentially be upgraded according to its very own and most perfect end.
Flourishing is regarded as the activity which involves the deployment of all the possibilities, which is closely linked to the concept of capabilities: everything that is potential is capable of developing and updating (ontological level). But it is also capable to evolve naturally according to some notion of good to its most perfect end (normative level).
Therefore, the notion of well-being in this context means the development of the beings and doings a human being is capable of according to some idea of good. Based on this notion of well-being as flourishing, Nussbaum articulates her theory of human functioning, which is meant to be used as the framework of a theory of justice and outlines her list of capabilities. The method to elicit her list and provide a Theory of Human Functioning proceeds in two steps: 1) First she exposes what features characterize a human being everywhere and in any time and she emphasizes ten characteristics.
2) From the previous characteristics she draws her list of capabilities arguing that from this features it is possible to define areas of experience in which human beings can make choices and constitute the valuable dimensions of human life.
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This list (Nussbaum 2000 (Nussbaum , 2006 (Nussbaum , 2011 is based on a particular conception of the human being as capable and needy; hence the list includes limits and expectations. Furthermore, the list is shaped as a set of "valuable things and doings": 1) Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length and not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2) Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health, to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3) Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4)
Sense, Imagination and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason -and to do these things in a "truly human" way. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literacy, musical and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5)
Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development. 
7)
Affiliation. This capability is twofold: a) Being able to live with and towards other, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.
Well-being as flourishing in the capabilities approach 43 b) Having the social bases of self-respect and non humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin. 8) Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature. 9) Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
Nussbaum's list does not only provide and account of what is a human life, rather she
outlines what is a fully human life, a good life that is being-well, that it's worthy. She adds an evaluative element to the characteristics of the figure of human being. Therefore from the concept of flourishing she stems the idea that a human being possesses capabilities that can be able to be transformed into functionings and these are the valuable dimensions that constitute the well-being of human beings or in Nussbaum's terms a flourishing human life.
